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Leverage and Intent in Lebanon’s War-Machine: A Look at the History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and its Modern Implications in an Ongoing Struggle
By: Paulo Lourenco

In the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict many of the same tactics have been employed; namely that of abductions, ambush skirmishes and suicide-bombings. Central to the Islamic doctrine of Shiite Muslims through inspiration of the Iranian Revolution, the state of Israel poses a special problem in tensions which run deep into the central mandate of Hizballah, “...dedicated to liberating Jerusalem and eliminating Israel, and has formally advocated ultimate establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon.” I will argue that in the ongoing struggle, Israel’s inability to adapt to guerrilla ambush style tactics and abductions has injured its ability to counteract and has, up until the exchange of July 2008, made no progress in thwarting the efforts of Hizballah to their own detriment and humiliation. Culturally and historically Lebanon and its surrounding patron nations have maintained Islamic supremacy which at the heart of Jerusalem is now threatened by the Israeli State, a holy site which is being held captive. Firstly, an examination of Shiite culture will serve as a backdrop to the growth of Muslim agency and power in Lebanon. I will then focus on the rise and effectiveness of Hizballah’s exploitative tactics in securing their position in the conflict against Israel. Finally a look at Israel’s efforts to counteract the tactics used against them and the use of negotiations will provide sufficient evidence to support the notion of Israel as fighting a continually losing battle.
What started as moderate political reformation and recognition with Shi’a Muslim culture in Lebanon would lead to an overwhelming sequence of socio-political movements, militia, and then the culmination of both. Lebanon’s independence in 1943 grew from French dominance into the Republic of Lebanon. The influence of the French was maintained in the Maronite Christian population which made up a majority and with whom a system of political sectarianism was shared with the Sunni. The Sunni and Shi’a represented the largest portion of Muslim groups yet the former was more active in government leaving Shiite culture relatively powerless. Large demographic shifts from Palestine however, and the dislocation of mass numbers of refugees overran Lebanon and the population tipped its balance favouring Shiites in the preceding years. The socio-economic reality of Shiites can be seen throughout the 1950s and early 60s in a moderately stable and flourishing economy where in the periphery of Beirut and the south, the Shi’a remained socio-politically and economically underdeveloped. The nature of the pluralist republic of Lebanon declared no official religion and for two almost two decades the state overlooked a population deserving a readjustment of government organization. However, the undercurrent of the south during the lead up to civil war would see the rise and split of many factions and influences, for example adjoining to the cause which suited best the needs of the people at a given time. The point here is that Lebanon never secured, or realigned a government to account and support the demographic changes of its country especially in the south where tensions would be highest, therefore public support and military might would serve as the basis for action and security. 
What really tipped the scale for alignment came after the invasion of Beirut in which Israel came to occupy the south and also had a government setup in Beirut. Yet the Shiite movement of Amal lacked organization and its inter-organizational disputes over political issues had disillusioned many who had supported their original intents, decisively splitting to favour a more radical approach that took form in the shape of Hizballah. Although the Hizballah is not a group entirely made up, or even entirely supported by Shiite Muslims, Iran had ensured funding and provided a template of inspiration from its revolution in 1978-9. The outrage of Israeli occupation and the impact of the invasion required a more active and brutal cause that would be in itself separate from the movements and organizations of Palestine and this is exactly what Hizballah came to represent, taking up the fight against all fronts and asserting Islamic dominance in Lebanon through its mandate.
The Hizballah is well aware of the extent to which Jewish burial rites and Israeli authorities are responsible for members of its security forces and citizens. Jewish customs demand that the bodies of the fallen are to be buried in their native land among the deceased of their family. This is the most sensitive issue faced by Israel and the Hizballah actively target member of the IDF for abduction knowing the Israeli state’s moral obligation to redeem prisoners and protect security forces from the hands of the enemy. Once Hizballah had become active in the years following the indecision after invasion in 1982, they began relentlessly exercising their tactics and spearheading the anti-Israeli movement, which included attacks against the South Lebanon Army. I will focus on two accounts in the course of Hizballah actions between 1986 and 2000 to exemplify and illustrate the effectiveness of Hizballah’s tactics to expel and effectively dominate the course of the war and political atmosphere of Lebanon. The first will revolve around the abduction of Ron Arad and the course of Israel to bring Hizballah to the negotiation table, and the second, a similar instance will be the case of Israel’s abduction of Sheik Abd al Karim Obeid.
Ron Arab was a pilot in the Israeli air forces who ejected from his plane during a flight mission over Lebanon in October 1986 and he was subsequently taken captive by the Amal Organization, specifically his captor, Mustafa Dirani. Tensions in the following year between the two Shiite organizations Amal and Hizballah shaded the Dirani affair in negotiations with Amal and Israel. The inter-organization issues concerning Amal, and Dirani’s movement to a new movement of the “Faithful Resistence” further inhibited Israel from acquiring accurate information regarding the health and obscured the plausibility of an exchange. In the process of attempted negotiation no progress was made and due to the failure of Israeli efforts to force a release of prisoners, Israel attempted a new policy of attaining their own leverage through abductions of their own. In 1989 Israeli security forces decisively set into action their plan to abduct a Hizballah leader Sheik Abd al Karim Obeid. Mustafa Dirani himself was also a target of Israeli abduction and in May 1994 was caught during a military operation carried out by the IDF. He was transferred to Israel with the hope that he would provide up-to-date information on the condition or whereabouts of Ron Arad. However, as in the case of Sheihk Obeid, these efforts failed to bring about what Israel had hope for through the reciprocal abduction of their enemy.
Israel’s deterministic retaliation to abduction by abductions of their own would prove disastrous in the efforts that they hoped to achieve. Instead they received the opposite of the intended, met with outrage by the Israeli people even toward their own government for the futility of holding captive Hizballah and Palestinian prisoners. In a sense they had been fundamentally undermined and hindered by their own policy and tradition. Attempting to fight fire with fire, so to speak, could not be successful because of the reasons for which they so desperately desired the exchanges. Hizballah has no such obligation to their fallen. What’s more, the fallen soldiers in Israel have been said to already be buried on Palestinian holy ground, merely occupied by the state of Israel.
Hassan Nasrallah addressed the issue of Lebanese bodies in Israel’s hands several times, including the body of his son Hadi, stating that there was no obligation to return them to their families because they were buried in the holy earth of Palestine. Thus, the Islamic terrorist organizations’ interest in the issue of the captives and prisoners does not stem from religious doctrine but rather from practical (political, social and humanitarian) considerations.

 Israel’s inability to effectively bring the Hizballah organization to negotiations has been a failure on their part of this struggle and very much encompasses exactly the means by which Hizballah has gained the upper hand time and again in this conflict. The conclusion can be drawn that Israel has not asserted effective means of combating this specific type of warfare. The Lebanese state has in effect been completely transformed by the influx of Muslim relocation and adaptation in the struggle, moving from a once politically lacking population made up of the Shiite community, to a well organized and complex network. Their control mechanisms have shaped and granted them agency to go beyond their once partnered desire to end occupation taking necessary action to ensure their security and the effectiveness of their goals.               

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